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Abstract
In 2013 Hungary introduced large scale targeted employers’ social se-
curity contribution cuts for the young, old, low-skilled, and other margin-
ally attached workforce, called the Job Protection Act (JPA). In this paper
I estimate the employment effects of the programme for the main target
groups using the discontinuities in the JPA’s design in a differences in dif-
ferences framework on administrative datasources. My estimates show ro-
bust and economically significant employment effects for the JPA, a total
1.2% point increase in employment rate three years after the introduction.
The JPA was highly effective in the young and low-skilled target groups,
with high self-financing ratios, while it was only marginally effective in the
old target group. The results suggests that targeted tax incentives can be a
cost-efficient way of increasing employment in vulnerable groups.
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1 Introduction
Historically, Hungarian employment and participation rateswere low compared
to other member states of the European Union. These differences can largely be
attributed the low participation of certain groups in the labour market. For the
pre-crisis periodKátay (2009) identified fourmain groups that can explainmost
of the difference between Hungarian and EU15 participation rates: employees
with primary education only, the cohorts below 25, above 50, and women of
childbearing age.
In recent years several policy measures were aimed at increasing the employ-
ment rates in these groups. The retirement age was gradually raised and early
retirement schemes were abolished. Significant tax reforms were also enacted.
The progressive tax schedule on labour income was repealed and replaced with
a flat rate system in several steps between 2011 and 2013, supplemented by a
child tax allowance. In 2013 an additional new measure was introduced, called
the Job Protection Act (JPA) with the aim to boost employment for certain vul-
nerable groups.
The JPA is a tax credit that reduces employers’ social security contributions
in groups where the Hungarian participation and employment rates are low:
permanently for all employees aged below 25, or above 55; employees working
in low-skilled jobs that don’t require any vocational training; and temporarily
(for three years) for employees returning to work after a child-care leave, and
newly hired long term unemployed and career starters. The target groups cover
around 900 thousand and in 2015 the programme’s annual fiscal cost was HUF
130 bn (0.4% of GDP).
In the recent years a strong labour market recovery started during which
employment among these vulnerable groups also increased. Figure 1 shows
changes in the employment rates for themajor JPA target groups on the primary,1
domestic2 labour market in the recent years based on the Hungarian Labour
1The public works programmes were significantly expanded after the crisis. Standard stat-
istical definitions count these government supported jobs as regular employment. Here, I will
focus on employment in the primary labour market, where the JPA available. Therefore I ex-
cluded participation in the public works programmes, which would distort the employment
rates for the low-skilled. Between 2013 and 2015 the monthly participation in the public works
programmes was 150–250 thousand.
2Migration of Hungarian workers to other EU countries increased in the recent years. The
LFS covers households in Hungary but nevertheless, many of these workers can be found in the
LFS sample. Some of them commute daily for the their jobs across the border (e.g. to Austria,
or Slovakia), but the LFS can also include those who work more or less permanently abroad but
still have family in Hungary (see Blaskó and Fazekas 2016).
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Figure 1: Changes in employment rate in the main JPA target groups
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Note: Employment in this figure is defined as the standard ILO definition in the LFS but without
people employed in the public works programmes and without people working abroad. Low-
skilled is defined as employees without a high school diploma.
Force Survey.3
We can see a large increase in employment rates of younger and older co-
horts, while employment rates of low-skilled prime age workers and mothers
with young children also increased slightly after the introduction of the JPA in
2013. The employment rate for prime age skilled workers also started increas-
ing in 2014 with the recovery. However, besides the pension and tax reforms,
and factors related to the business cycle, several other trends could be driving
these. In 2014 the child care benefits were mademore flexible, which could help
mothers with young children return to the labour market, while the technolo-
gical changes in the economy and changing skill composition of the labour force
could influence the the demand for low-skilled labour.
In this paper I will estimate the causal employment effects of the JPA using a
quasi-experimental setup. The JPA was introduced in a single step for all target
3Career starters and long term unemployed according to the JPA eligibility criteria cannot be
identified separately in the data. Career starters are included in the below 25 group.
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groups. The eligibility is defined using simple rules, which will result in some
groups covered by the JPA, while others—who are similar to the treated group
in many regards—not covered. These discontinuities can be used to construct
counterfactuals to identify the true effects of the JPA. In order to separate most
confounding factors, like the expansion of the public works schemes, I will use
administrative micro data to identify the treated and control groups of the JPA
target groups and use a differences in differences estimator to get a causal estim-
ate for the employment effects for the JPA.
My results show robust, statistically and economically significant employ-
ment effects for the programme. The JPA increased employment by around 1.2
percentage points three years after its introduction. The effects were heterogen-
eous across the target groups, the employment rate in the below 25 group in-
creased by 2.6%, in the low-skilled group by 2.2% but only by 0.8% in the above
55 group, and the JPA increased exits to employment from long term unemploy-
ment by around 0.7%. Due to limitations in the available data, I was not able
to estimate the effects of the JPA among mothers with young children. The res-
ults suggest, the JPA led to some substitution between eligible and non-eligible
low-skilled workers but the overall substitution effect was small.
Based on these results I will do a rough cost-benefit analysis that shows an
overall self-financing ratio (the amount of tax collected from the higher employ-
ment divided by the total tax expenditure of the JPA) of around 40%. For the
low-skilled it was as high as 70% but for the above 55 groups as low as 14%.
This partial equilibrium analysis ignores potential second round, orwage effects,
therefore they can be considered as a lower bound but they should capture the
main channel of adjustment.
These results show that targeted tax incentives can be a cost-effective way for
boosting employment of vulnerable groups in Hungary.
Ex post studies of the JPAwere not done previously. Benedek, Kátay andKiss
(2013) used ex ante simulations, based on a dynamic labour supply microsim-
ulation model embedded in a general equilibrium macro model to predict the
JPA’s labour market and macroeconomic effects. According to their results, the
programmewas expected to increase the employment rate by 1 percentage point
in the long run, after adjustments in the supply of labour and capital. My ex-post
analysis suggests slightly higher employment effects.
The JPA is quite unique with its broad coverage. It was not only novel in
Hungary, but there aren’t many examples for similar tax incentives form other
countries either. Temporary hiring credits for long term unemployed, child care
returnees, or career starters are common in many countries. However, large
scale targeted tax incentives for vulnerable groups—which are general and un-
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conditional in the sense that eligibility doesn’t depend on the level of income—
using some form of tagging are rare. Sweden introduced similar schemes in
2007 in employers’ social security contributions for young (below 25) and old
(above 65) employees but unlike the JPA, these tax credits were not capped.
The tax cut for young workers was analysed by Egebark and Kaunitz (2017)
who found small positive employment effects and no wage effects using a quasi-
experimental differences in differences method. LowHungarian youth particip-
ation rate might explain why the JPAwas muchmore effective than the Swedish
tax incentive. The tax cut for older workers was analysed by Laun (2012) who
found some positive effects on employment of men, with effects higher than for
the JPA. The two programmes are also different, the Swedish tax credit targeted
employees close to the official retirement age, while the JPA targeted a broader
group. My analysis is not able to identify the effects of the JPA for older work-
ers but it is possible that the JPA was also more effective in raising employment
among workers closer to retirement. However, the pension reforms introduced
around the same time make the identification of these effects difficult.
Targeted tax incentives for long term unemployed and other inactive groups
existed in Hungary before the JPA. These voucher based system called Start
had mostly narrow target groups but offered higher subsidies than the JPA. Sev-
eral Start programmes were studied using quasi-experimental methods. Cseres-
Gergely, Scharle andFöldessy (2015) analysedprogrammes targeting low-skilled,
older workers and found significant effects for older men with vocational train-
ing. According to their analysis, the programme was cost-effective even though
it was only effective in raising the employment of men. Szabó-Morvai (2015)
analysed the Start programme formothers returning after a child care leave. The
programme had an overall small employment effect but it significantly raised
employment among skilledmotherswithmultiple children. My analysis showed
high effects on exits to a job from long term unemployment under the JPA. How-
ever, it is uncertain how permanent these effects were.
2 The Job Protection Act
Taxation of labour changed significantly in Hungary since 2010. The progress-
ive personal income tax was replaced with a flat rate system and a family tax
allowance. In 2013 a large scale employers’ tax incentive, called Job Protection
Act (JPA) was introduced with the aim of boosting labour force participation of
certain disadvantaged groups whose participation rates were low in Hungary
compared to either the European average, or to regional peers.
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The JPA consists of six different types of tax credits in the employers’ social
security contributions (27% at the time of the introduction4) and payroll taxes
(1.5%). There are two major types of credits. The permanent cuts, which cover
the largest target groups can be claimed by employers as long the as the employ-
ees fall under the following categories, regardless of when the job started. The
amount of the JPA in these categories is 14 percentage points of the gross wage5
capped at HUF 100,000 in each month.6
Below 25 Employees below the age of 25 are entitled for the tax credit until and
including the month of their 25th birthday.
Above 55 Employees above the age of 55 are entitled for the tax credit beginning
in the month of their 55th birthday.
Elementary occupations Any employee working in an elementary occupation
defined as main category 9 according to the Hungarian Central Statistical
Office’s HSCO-08 classification system7 is eligible for the JPA. These oc-
cupations don’t require formal qualifications and consist of simple tasks.
This group includes basic service sector jobs like cleaning and fast food
workers, simple industry jobs like warehouse workers and some assembly
lineworkers. Category 9 of theHSCO covers some elementary agricultural
jobs but not the majority. Employees are eligible as long as their occupa-
tion is in category 9 of the HSCO.
The other major types of tax cuts are temporary. Only employees starting a
job after the introduction of the JPA are eligible, and in general, the cuts expire
after three years. The amount of the JPA in these categories is 28.5 percentage
points of the gross wage (which means a full exemption from social security tax
and the vocational contribution) during the first two years after hiring, and 14
4Beginning in 2017 the employers’ SSCwas cut several times and the amount of the JPA credit
was adjusted. The target groups were also expanded with low-skilled agricultural occupations
and the length of the tax credit for mothers with at least three children was extended to five
years in 2015. The period covered by this analysis is not affect by these changes.
5At the time of the introduction of the JPA the average tax wedge was 49% according to the
OECD methodology. However, this this figure doesn’t include targeted tax cuts like the JPA at
any income level (OECD 2017).
6HUF 100,000 was 102 percent of the full time minimumwage at the time of the introduction
of the JPA. Due to minimum wage raises the ratio decreased to 98.5 percent in 2014 and to 95.2
percent in 2015.
7See https://www.ksh.hu/feor_eng_menu. The classification is broadly comparable to the
ILO’s ISCO-08 classification, although there are small differences.
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percentage point in the third year. The amount is capped at HUF 100,000 in each
month. The following categories were introduced.
Long term unemployed Unemployed people, who registered as unemployed at
a local employment agency, and find a job after a long spell of unemploy-
ment are eligible for this SSC cut if at the start of the job they had been
unemployed for at least 6 months in the previous 9 months. For the cal-
culation of the unemployment spells certain atypical work arrangements
are not considered as employment (e.g. simplified employment, which is
a form of temporary work) while the time of participation in the govern-
ment financed public works programmes is not counted in either the 6
month, or the 9 month period. That is, for people enrolled in the pub-
lic works scheme, the eligibility has to determined by adding up multiple
spells of non-employed periods.8 In order to claim the credit, the newly
hired employees have to provide their employers a certificate issued by
the employment agency about their eligibility.
Childcare returnees The JPA credit is available for employees who start work-
ing (either by returning to their previous job, or starting a new job) after
they stop receiving childcare benefits, or employees who start working
while still receiving childcare benefits.
Career starters In addition the the permanent SSC reduction for the below 25
group, a higher SSC cut is available for career starters. Employees below
the age of 25with amaximum of 180 days of paidwork earlier in their lives
are eligible for a temporary SSC reduction.
Employers can choose which SSC cuts they claim if an employee is eligible
for several JPA types. However, only one type can by claimed at once. For all
categories, the JPA is available only for private sector employers and only for em-
ployees in standard employment contracts (it is not available for atypical forms,
e.g. temporary, or public works, and self-employment).
3 Data
I use two anonymous administrative data sources for the analysis. Tax returns
from the National Tax and Customs Agency (NTCA) cover the entire popula-
8The rule was changed in 2016, and since that public works spells count as non-employment
for the purposes of the JPA.
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tion of individual taxpayers and the dataset from the Central Office for Adminis-
trative and Electronic Public Services (COAEPS) covers the entire population of
people who were registered as job-seekers by the National Employment Agency.
3.1 Tax returns
The main data source is a panel covering the period between 2009 and 2015,
built from linked, anonymous datasets of employers’ monthly social security
and tax filings, and individuals’ annual tax returns. The monthly filings contain
detailed data on employment but they are only available for themonth ofMay in
each year. Linking these datasets across the years gives a fully balanced panel of
the population of Hungarian taxpayers: those who were employed, or received
some form of taxable benefit at least once during the month of May in these
years, or filed a tax return between 2009 and 2015.
In the raw database a single observation from the annual tax returns is the
detailed income declaration of an individual taxpayer across the various taxable
income sources. In the employers’ filings a single observation describes the the
income earned during a particular period by an individual from a specific em-
ployer. It also has information on the income earned, the type and length of
the contract, and occupation. An individual can appear several times in a single
month (e.g. switching jobs during the month, having a second job, or due to
accounting revisions), therefore the data needed to be aggregated. During the
cleaning process contracts not in May in each year were omitted, data was har-
monized across the years, and from the remaining contracts it was determined
whether an individual had at least one day of paid work during the month at an
employerwho is eligible for the JPA (i.e. excluding the public sector) in a regular
labour contract. Participation in the public works programmes was considered
as non-employment for the same reason. Finally, the data was extended with
age, gender and occupation, and linked with information about the employers.
This dataset covers the whole taxpaying population but effects in terms of
employment to population ratios are easier to interpret and they also control for
demographic changes. Therefore population statistics by age and gender were
used to impute observation needed to cover the entire population aged 20 to 59.
The final dataset covers around 6.2 million people in this age bracket9 between
2010 and 2015. Data for 2009 was only used to construct a lagged employment
9This might overstate the size of the active population, as recently emigrated people, who
were employed in Hungary during the period will be counted. This might bias employment
rates downwards but it won’t bias the estimated total employment gains.
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variable, otherwise observations for 2009 were omitted. The descriptive statist-
ics are shown in Table 13.
3.2 Unemployment registry
The JPA credit for the long-term unemployed is conditional on the length of un-
employment and non-employment at the time of starting a new job. As the tax
returns have only one observation per individual and per year about the type
and length of employment, they are not sufficient to identify those who are eli-
gible for the long-term unemployed tax credit. A second data source, the unem-
ployment registry is used for this target group.
The unemployed in Hungary are required to register at the employment
agencies in order to claim unemployment benefits, participate in ALMPs, or
public works programmes. The registry is a complete database of all entries
and exits to and from official unemployment along with the reason for exit (e.g.
found a job, participated in public works employment, retirement). The employ-
ment agencies record additional information about the jobseekers, of which age,
gender, educational attainment and residence are available.
The registry covers around 2 million people, who were unemployed at least
once between January 2011 and June 2015. One observation in the database is
the record of an entry, or an exit with its date. Exits can be permanent (e.g. find-
ing a job, going into retirement, or other form of inactivity), or temporary (par-
ticipating public works programmes, finding certain types of temporary jobs).
Correspondingly, an entry can be a new entry (the person was not in contact
with the job office), or a re-entry form a temporary exit. This data structure was
transformed into a fully balanced panel of all covered individuals that shows
how many days an individual spent in unemployment, or in public works pro-
grammes in a particular month. Using the recorded reason for the exit, it was
determined whether someone successfully applied for a job not in the public
works programmes and a job that is not subsidized in other labour market pro-
grammes.10 After successful exits the employment agency does some monitor-
ing using data from employers about the type of the new job. This was used
to determine whether the new job is in the public sector (where the JPA is not
available).
As the eligibility for the JPA credit at the time of starting a job can change
even day-by-day, the outcome variable has to describe a relatively short period
10Note, that the JPA, or other tax incentives are not considered as subsidies here. This refers
to direct wage subsidies in various employment programmes, that often cover 100%, or more of
the labour costs.
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of time. I will use monthly exit rates and eligibility at the end of the month.
Estimates for the major JPA groups from the tax database will be available for
May only, thus I will only estimate the long term unemployed JPA credit’s effects
on successful exits for eachMay using data from 2011 and 2015.11 I will use three
and twelve month survival rates as additional outcome variables to measure
long term impact but data on employment survival is fairly unreliable.
Finally, the number of days spent in unemployment and in public works pro-
grammes was used to calculate the length of unemployment spells according to
the eligibility criteria of the long term unemployed. Eligibility requires at least
six months of non-employment, therefore the final panel spans from 2012 to
2015. The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 14.
4 Empirical strategy
As described in the previous section, the JPA has clear eligibility criteria for all
target groups which is observable in the data. Therefore, it is possible to find
different sets of individuals who are similar to individuals in each JPA target
group but who are not eligible for JPA tax credits. These groups can be used as
controls to construct a counterfactuals and identify the employment effect of the
JPA tax cuts.
The JPA was introduced in one step, in January 2013. This lends itself to
a differences in differences estimator, in which the employment probabilities of
treated (JPA) and non-treated (non-JPA) individuals is compared pre-treatment
and post-treatment.
In general, the following equation is estimated for each JPA target group:
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐽𝑃𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡𝐽𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1)
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 shows is whether individual 𝑖 is employed in period 𝑡 at an employer
who is eligible for the JPA, and in a labour contract that is also eligible for the
JPA. 𝐽𝑃𝐴𝑖 indicates whether the individual is in the JPA target group, 𝛽3𝑡 are
time fixed effects for several periods before and after the introduction of the JPA,
and 𝐽𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the interaction between treatment and period. Therefore 𝛽4𝑡 are
the variables of interest in the estimation, showing the changes in employment
11Entries into unemployment might be relevant for the assessment of the JPA but the unem-
ployment registry only covers the population of those who were registered as unemployed at
least once, and the COAEPS data can’t be linked to other sources, thus flows into unemployment
can’t be analysed.
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probabilities due to the JPA in each period after introduction. The JPA was an-
nounced in August 2012. As the final data cover only May in each year, possible
anticipatory effects can be ruled out, and all years after that are considered as
post-JPA.
Thedifferences in differencesmethod requires a commonpre-treatment trend
in employment between the treated and control groups. This might not hold
but using further control variables 𝑋𝑖, including age, gender and lagged labour
market status12 can increase the reliability of the estimates by reducing the het-
erogeneity of the treated and control groups. The estimates can still suffer from
omitted variable bias, as many other individual specific factors can influence
the probability of working. A possible solution would be to use a fix effects
estimator. The drawback of this approach is that defining treatment and con-
trol groups based on age will omit some individuals in some years (see Sub-
section 4.1), which itself can introduce bias in the estimations. Instead, I will
use past employment as a control variable which correlates highly with current
employment.
I will estimate Equation (1) for the three major JPA groups using linear prob-
ability models (LPM). The goal is to estimate the marginal effects of 𝛽4𝑡 for all
periods. These tend to be very similar for LPMs and for non-linear functional
forms, like the logistic, or probit regressions in case of outcome probabilities that
are not close to zero, or one. Here, the less strict conditions and easier interpret-
ation of LPMs offer an advantage. However, in case of the low average exit rates
for the long term unemployed the marginal rates can differ between LPMs and
non-linear models, therefore in these cases I will estimate logistic regressions.
This differences in differences method can have several potential drawbacks.
In order to get internally valid estimates, the treated and control groups have to
be similar to each other. Since the target groups are quite broad, entire target
groups might not be usable as treated groups in the estimations. However, a
narrower treatment group used in the analysis could lead to a loss in external
validity, as estimates will be valid only for a subgroup of the eligible population.
Additionally, this method measures changes in employment probabilities of
the JPA target groups relative to similar groups. At the same time, the JPA also
changed the relative wages of employees in these groups. Holding everything
else constant, this could lead to a decreased demand for workers who are not
eligible for the JPA credits relative to those who are eligible. If employers do
12I will use a broader definition of employment for the lagged variable that includes self-
employment, temporary work and employment in the public sector but still excludes particip-
ation in the public works programmes. The aim is to control for past labour market status in
general, while the outcome variable should only count employment in the JPA.
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such substitution in their hiring, the employment gains from these estimations
would be upward biased.
4.1 Defining treatment and control groups
The heterogeneous effects of the JPA across the various target groups are in them-
selves of interest when evaluating the programme but the different labour mar-
ket situation in the target groups also require separate analyses, as different con-
siderations have to made when selecting the population to identify the JPA’s
effects.
In general, I will analyse intention of treatment. Eligibility for the JPA doesn’t
necessary mean an employer will also claim the credit. If take-up rate is low and
the JPA has an effect on employment, the estimated parameter will be biased
downward, as it will include all the potential gains in employment in the treated
population. For the purposes of estimating the extra employment due to the JPA,
and calculating the tax cut’s cost efficiency this it is not a limitation. Figure 2
shows the absolute numbers of eligible employees and the number of claimants,
and the take-up ratio. The take-up was was already fairly high in May 2013—
fivemonths after introduction—and it increased by next year in all major target
groups. The take-up is highest among the young employees, while in the older
and low-skilled groups it is somewhat lower. The long term unemployed and
child care returnee target groups are much smaller. The number of eligible em-
ployees is not available directly for last two categories but estimates based on
other data sources suggest a take-up rate of around 40 and 20 percent respect-
ively.
Below 25 Similarly to Egebark and Kaunitz (2017), using the age of 25 as a
cut-off value is a straightforward approach for this target group. The choice of
the control group is limited, people several years older than 25 have different
employment prospects, therefore I will use the 25–27 year old cohorts as control
group. All cohorts below 25 are eligible for the JPA but the individual cohorts
face different labourmarket conditions that could violate the parallel trends con-
dition. A narrower age bracket sacrifices some external validity but using only
the 22–24 year old cohorts as treatment group can increase the reliability of the
estimates. Nevertheless, the effects of the JPA on the younger cohorts is relevant
from a policy perspective. Employment rate of university graduates in Hungary
is close to the EU average but the employment rate of those without a tertiary
degree is significantly lower. One can expect the JPA to have a positive effect
12
Figure 2: Enrolment in the JPA target groups
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Source: NTCA database, own calculations
on employment prospects in the 19–23 year old cohorts among those who left
school by this age, either by dropping out, or never attending university but this
analysis will not provide separate estimates for this group.
In this analysis I will not estimate the effect of the separate JPA credit for ca-
reer starters because the available data sources don’t have information of total
days worked. Since only few employers claim this JPA credit, and the main ef-
fect of the programme can be expected from the general credit targeting young
people, this is not a major limitation when evaluating the JPA.
Above 55 Age-based cut-offs can be used here similar to the below 25 target
group with similar trade-offs. In this case a wider age bracket could identify
the JPA’s effect on early retirements (see e.g. Laun 2012). However, there were
major changes in the Hungarian pension system since 2012 that aimed at raising
labour force participation in cohorts, where there is a lot of overlap with the JPA.
The eligibility for the various early retirement schemes is not observable in the
available data, which limits the list of cohorts for possible treatment groups. In
general, people below 57 are not eligible for early retirement, therefore I will use
the 55–57 year old cohorts as the treated group and the 52–54 year old cohorts as
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Figure 3: Educational attainment across occupations by two-digit HSCO-08
codes for manual workers in 2012
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Note: Definition of employment is the same as in Figure 1. The chart shows educational attain-
ment only for prime age employees (between 25 and 54).
the controls. The regular retirement agewas at least 62 during the years relevant
for this analysis. However, since 2012 women are eligible for retirement after 40
years of service which lowers the effective retirement age for somewomen (high
school degree, or less; while continuously employed, or cared for children) but
in general this shouldn’t affect the cohorts selected for the analysis. Previous
early retirement schemes usually were not effective in these age brackets either.
Low-skilled Unlike the previous two groups, eligibility in this case is not ob-
servable for the non-employed. Occupations in category 9 of the HSCO-08 con-
sist of low-skilled jobs in a variety of economic sectors (industry, services, agri-
culture) and Figure 3 shows that there are other occupations in all these sectors
that employ mainly low-skilled workers without an upper secondary degree.
The share of these is particularly high in agriculture but it is also high in food
processing and construction, while many retail occupations—which employ a
large number of people—don’t require post-secondary degrees (see left panel
in Figure 4). Low wages, which are close to the wages attainable in the least
skilled category 9 occupations also reflect on the low productivity of these work-
ers (right panel in Figure 4).
Past occupations are observable in the available data which allows the con-
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Figure 4: Employment and wage levels by three-digit HSCO-08 occupations for
manual workers in 2012
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struction of a proxy measure of skill-level. People change occupations across
these categories (which shows that these jobs are substitutes in some sense) but
switching rates are not high. Therefore people who held a job in category 9 can
be considered as treated in the JPA and people who held a job in an occupation
similar to category 9 but didn’t hold in category 9 can be considered as con-
trols.13 Similarity between occupations is based on the average wages, as seen
in Figure 4. Occupations where educational levels are higher were excluded
from the control groups.
As Figures 3 and 4 show, there aremany low-skilledworkers employed in the
retail sector, where average wages are also low. However, retail sector is more
heterogeneous, more workers have upper secondary degrees. Due to the large
number of retail employees, I will add commercial occupations (ISCO-08 511)
to the control group in an alternative specification.
Employers are free to choose which JPA credit they take for the young, or
old low-skilled workers, and the amount of the credit is the same for all three
groups. To keep the estimates of the different groups easily interpretable, estim-
ations of the low-skilled target group will only cover the 25–54 age group, while
estimations for the below 25 and above 55 groups will include all skill levels.
Long term unemployed People who had been unemployed since the same
date can have different eligibility status for the long term unemployed JPA credit
if they participated in the publicworks schemeduring their unemployment spell.
An unemployed person, who registered as unemployed six months before hir-
ing was only eligible if she didn’t participate in the public works schemes. This
can be used as the identification strategy because people who are identical in
every other regard but who were not employed in the primary labour market
for the same amount of time have different eligibility status.
Data on unemployment spells is available from the unemployment registry
(see Section 3.2). A successful outcomewill be an exit to a non-subsidized job in
Equation (1), with the JPA status based on eligibility described in the previous
paragraph, controlling for the length of the unemployment spell, including time
spent in the public works scheme.
Participation in the public works programme is observable in the data but
other active labour market programmes (ALMPs) are not. Ideally the analysis
should control for the participation in ALMPs, as these, along with the public
13Only occupations in labour contracts eligible for the JPA were taken into account. HSCO-08
has been in force since January 2011, and there is no direct, one-to-one correspondence with the
previous version of the occupational classification. Therefore, only occupations held since 2011
were taken into account.
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works programme could influence the probability of successfully leaving unem-
ployment, as unemployed people can gain skills, or experience in these.
The changes in the tax system during the period covered in this analysis
could affect the work or hiring incentives in either the JPA target groups, or the
control groups. For the three major target groups these changes didn’t have dif-
ferent affects on the treated and control groups. However, for the long term
unemployed there could be an issue due to certain employers’ tax incentives
that were in place before the JPA. Until 2013 there were several narrowly tar-
geted, voucher-based tax incentives called Start. Under the Start programmes
employers could claim tax credits when hiring long term unemployed. The
Start eligibility criteria were slightly different than the JPA criteria. One Start
programme—Bónusz— was in force in 2012 and 2013. This programme was
available for people who were unemployed continuously for at least six months.
There were other, smaller scale programmes for career starters, low-skilled, or
old unemployed, and mothers with young children. Therefore, I will estimate
another model, only including jobseekers outside the target group of the major
Start programmes: men aged between 30 and 50 with at least a lower secondary
degree.
Data is only available for one year in the pre-treatment period, which makes
the estimations more uncertain. However, this is not a major issue for this target
group, as the method of identification uses the different treatment of particip-
ation in the public works programmes, where treatment status didn’t change
for the whole target group at once. Therefore we can use the variance between
individuals over time.
I will estimate twomodels for this target group. First, using all exits of unem-
ployed workers who had been in the registry unemployed, or in public works
schemes for at least six months. Second, the same model with those, who were
not eligible for the Start subsidies: unemployedmen, between the ages of 30 and
50, with at least lower secondary education.
Motherswith young children Apossible approach for identification is to com-
pare the employment probabilities of mothers of children of different age, simil-
arly to Szabó-Morvai (2015). The potential effects of the Start programmes have
to be considered in the selection of the treated and control groups in this case
too. Some data on the number and age of children is available in the tax returns
through the family allowance, and the duration of childcare leave can also be
identified. However, neither of these are sufficient to create treated and control
groups without major biases, or omissions. Therefore, I will not estimate the ef-
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Table 1: Differences in differences coefficients for the main regression results
Below 25 Above 55 Low-skilled
JPA × 2010 −0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2011 0.004∗ −0.002 −0.029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2013 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2014 0.019∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
JPA × 2015 0.026∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level. For the full tables see Models (4) from Tables 5 and 6, and
Model (5) from Table 8.
fect of the JPA in this target group. Further work and additional data is needed
to extend this research.
5 Regression results
The results for the three major target groups are summarized in Table 1 with
the differences in differences (DiD) coefficients from the full models including
demographic controls and lagged employment. The detailed results for these
target groups can be found in Tables 5, 6, and 8. The tables present four mod-
els: (1) a simple DiD model; (2) a DiD with demographic controls; (3) a DiD
with lagged employment; and (4) the full model, a DiD with demographic con-
trols and lagged employment. As anticipated, the basic differences in differences
model suffers from omitted variable bias. The DiD coefficients are significant at
the conventional levels. The demographic controls and the lagged dependent
variables are also significant, the coefficient of lagged employment is large, and
their inclusion decreases the DiD coefficients for all three target groups.
The estimated effects are increasing in time, which is expected, as both em-
ployers and employees need time to adjust to the tax incentive. The JPA already
had economically significant effect on the employment probabilities of these
three target groups even in the first year, five months after the introduction.
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Pre-treatmentDiD coefficients also become insignificantwith lagged employ-
ment for the below 25 and above 55 groups but not for low-skilled. This suggest
that the pre-treatment parallel trends assumptions are likely to hold, and the
method is able to identify the true effect of the JPA for the below 25 and above
55 groups. For the low-skilled group a possible explanation for negative pre-
treatment effects could be the long term decline in the employment of the low-
skilled but these results suggest that the conditions for the DiD estimates might
not hold.
Another explanation can be that the last occupation held has a major impact
on what kind of new job an employee will take. The proxy measure used as
treatment variable for skill level is based on all previous private sector occupa-
tions. Model (5) in Table 8 includes additional fixed effects for past occupation.
While this model still has the same issue with a significant pre-treatment DiD
effect, due to the significant and large coefficients for past occupation, and their
impact in the DiD coefficients, this is the preferred model for the cost-benefit
analyses. A further robustness check is shown for the low-skilled in Table 9 us-
ing an alternative definition for the control group, including retail workers. The
estimated effects in this model are lower. Overall, these results suggest that the
estimates for the low-skilled group are possibly the most uncertain.
Table 7 shows estimations for the above 55 group broken down by gender.
TheDiD coefficients formen are not significant, while forwomen they are higher
than the average effect for the whole cohort. One explanation why the JPA was
ineffective in raising the employment rates of men could be that such a tax cut
only affects employment probabilities for people close to the retirement age (see
Laun 2012; Albanese and Cockx 2015). The method is based on comparing the
52–53 year old with 56–57 the old. For men, these cohorts are far form either
the effective, or the statutory the retirement age but for women they are close to
the effective retirement age due to the early retirement scheme after 40 years of
service. There were no significant gender differences for the JPA’s effects in the
two other target groups.
Table 2 shows the estimatedmarginal effects from the preferredmodel for the
long termunemployedwith the full results of the second specification using only
non-Start jobseekers in Table 11. The results for the first specification using all
eligible jobseekers are in Table 10. I used logistic models, as the exit probabilities
from the unemployment registry are very low (between 2 and 4%), themarginal
effects from an LPM can be very different from marginal effects in a non-linear
model.
Although the average exit probabilities are decreasing in time, the estimated
DiD effects with individual-specific factors are increasing. The JPA increased
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Table 2: Marginal effects of the JPA for the long term unemployed from Table 11
Exit to job
(1 month
survival)
Exit to job
(3 month
survival)
Exit to job
(12 month
survival)
2013 0.000 0.000 −0.000
2014 0.005 0.004 0.002
2015 0.007
one month exit rates by 0.7 percentage points to an observed 1.6%. As the data
spans to exits in June 2015, three and twelve month exit rates are only available
for 2013 and 2014. The JPA’s effect on three and twelve month survival rates
are not significant. While this could indicate that the credit had no long term ef-
fect, the data available after leaving the unemployment registry is limited, which
makes the measurement of these outcomes more uncertain.
5.1 Substitution effects
The design of the JPA limits the incentive to substitution within target groups,
because employees in the three major target groups are eligible regardless when
they were hired. However employers could still substitute employees not in the
JPA target groups for those who are eligible. To check whether such substitution
occurred, Equation (1) with the full set of controls can be estimated with the
control groups from the previous section as “treated” groups (i.e. whose relative
labour cost went up compared to the JPA target groups) and groups completely
outside the scope of the JPA as controls. This means people in their early 30s for
the young control group, people in their late 40s for the old control group and
the those prime age manual workers who were not selected in either the treated,
or control groups for the low-skilled regressions.
Table 12 shows the results. There are no signs of substitution for the non-
eligible younger and older cohorts, the DiD coefficients are non-significant. The
employment probabilities for the low-skilled but non-JPA workers decreased
compared to other prime age blue collar employees (categories 5–8 in HSCO-08)
using both the main and the alternative control group specifications. However,
as discussed in Subsection 6.1, the overall effects of this substitution on employ-
ment levels is low.
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6 Discussion and policy analysis
The results described in Section 5 show the effects attributed to the JPA but due
to themethodological limitations discussed in Subsection 4.1 only for the treated
and control groups used in the regression analysis which are narrower than the
entire JPA target groups. To analyse the overall effect of the programme, to cal-
culate labour demand elasticities, and to do a cost-benefit analysis, these results
have to be extrapolated for the whole treated population.
6.1 Employment effects
Figure 5 shows the JPA’s impact in the three major target groups, extrapolating
the regression results to the broader target groups. As discussed earlier, a tax
subsidy for the youngest cohort— just after leaving school—and the oldest co-
horts—close to retirement—could have very different effects than the estimates
identified here comparing the cohorts around the JPA’s age cutoff. Therefore, the
below 25 groups consist of the 20–24 cohorts, the above 55 of the 55–59 cohorts,14
and the low-skilled group consist of everyone identified as low-skilled accord-
ing the proxy measure for skill in the estimation control groups. Employment
ratios are calculated for the whole labour market, including the public sector,
where the JPA is not available.
The counterfactuals are calculated as a percentage point difference of the
regression results for each year in Table 1 from the observed employment ra-
tios. The counterfactual lines show that the employment rates of all three target
groups would have increased even without the JPA during the labour market
recovery starting in 2013, but the JPA significantly increased employment rates
for the young (from 30.8% to 33.4% by 2015 ) and the low-skilled (from 27.2%
to 29.4%by 2015).
Figure 6 translates these results into number of jobs gained due to the JPA,
and also corrects for the substitution effect found for the low-skilled target group.
The JPA significantly increased the employment probabilities of the low-skilled
workers, and due to the relatively large size of this target group (see Figure 2),
most of the gains in employment levels—approximately 30 thousand by 2015—
came from the low-skilled workforce. The young employees’ relatively small tar-
get group leads to only a 16 thousand increase in employment, despite the JPA’s
strong effects in this group. Employees above 55 form the largest target group,
which means even with the JPA’s low impact on their employment probabilities,
14Note, that the data was prepared only for the 20–59 cohorts.
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Figure 5: Observed and counterfactual employment rates for themain JPA target
groups
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Note: The vertical line shows the introduction of the JPA in January 2013. Counterfactuals cal-
culated from Models (4) from Tables 5 and 6, and Model (5) from Table 8.
the JPA raised employment levels by around 5,000.15
The substitution effect amounts to only 2,600 in the low-skilled group control
group, which was subtracted from the low-skilled figures in the chart.
The estimated effects for the long term unemployed credit are in terms of exit
rates, that can’t be translated directly into employment figures. On one hand,
there is uncertainty around the three and twelve month survival rates. On the
other hand, monthly employment estimates for the other JPA groups can be in-
terpreted as a good approximation for the annual effects but monthly exit rates
for the long term unemployed can differ from the annual exit rates. Neverthe-
less, we can give an upper bound by looking at the number of people in a partic-
ular year who were registered as unemployed, or as public works participants
and had an at least sixmonths long unemployment spell (thatmight span across
two years) and counting howmany of them left the registry byDecember of that
year. In 2014 this group was around 460 thousand, of whom 44 thousand had
a successful exit, a 8.6% exit rate. If the long term unemployed JPA increased
this exit rate by 0.7% (see Table 2), the total effect would be around 3.5 thou-
15Note, that in this paper the low-skilled group always refers to prime age employees only,
low-skilled young and old workers are counted in young and old target groups respectively.
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Figure 6: Net employment gains caused by JPA in the main target groups
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Note: Employment effects calculated from (4) from Tables 5 and 6, andModel (5) from Table 8,
substitution effects from Table 12.
sand. In May 2015 there were 31 thousand employees covered by the long-term
unemployed JPA credit, and half of them had been in their jobs for less than a
year. This back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the effect of the JPA for
the long term unemployed was small, it increased employment by a few thou-
sand. Adding these to the figures for the three major groups would increase
the total employment gains by around 7%. However, compared to the actual
number of newly hired claimants this effect is fairly substantial.
6.2 Budgetary effects
These net employment gains are also associatedwith general equilibrium effects,
e.g. more consumption by the newly hired employees, which could increase out-
put bymore than just the higher employment through the JPA. Potential savings
can also come from lower expenditure on unemployment benefits, pensions, or
on labour market programmes, including employment in the public works pro-
grammes, which were not estimated in this papers. Simulations by Benedek,
Kátay and Kiss (2013) based on the general equilibriummicrosimulation model
by Benczúr, Kátay and Kiss (2012) showed that the main effects, in particular
the extra budgetary revenues of labour taxation reforms come from the direct
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behavioural changes in labour supply and labour demand. Therefore I will fo-
cus on the higher taxes and social security contributions coming from the net
employment gains while noting, these should be considered as a lower bound.
To calculate the budgetary effect, a few assumptions have to be made. Tax
rates stayed constant during the period of the analysis. Hungary has a com-
pletely flat PIT system with a statutory rate of 16%. The only major deduction is
the family allowance for dependent children, claimed by around a quarter of the
taxpayers. According to figures by the NTCA, the average effective tax rate was
14%. Social security contributions are also flat, except for the JPA credits. Em-
ployees pay 18.5% SSCs, and employers pay 28.5% SSC. All new employees are
eligible for the standard JPA tax credit, which amounts to HUF 14,500/month.16
Due to the flat tax system, these rates can be applied to the average private sector
wages excluding public works programme participants for each year and each
target group.
The estimated employment effects refer to monthly gains for the month of
May in each year. The methodology cannot identify whether this led to perman-
ent employment for the newly hired. Considering that May tends to be an “av-
erage” month in terms of employment levels, we can assume the same effect for
all year, and multiply the May budgetary estimate by 12 for an annual estimate.
Finally, we can calculate self-financing ratios, by dividing the above estimates
for the budgetary gains with the total budgetary expenditure on the JPA. The
results are shown in Table 3.
The uncertainty in calculating the employment effects of the long term un-
employed credit makes the estimation of budgetary effects also difficult. The
amount of tax revenue gained through entering employment heavily depends
on how long the newly hired could stay in their jobs but the data sources used
in the paper don’t provide sufficient guidance for this.
6.3 Labour demand elasticities
The quasi-experimental setup used is this paper doesn’t allow the separation
of demand and supply effects but it is still useful to describe the the results in
terms of elasticities. Based on employment rates in Figure 5 and the regression
coefficients, we can calculate elasticities 𝜂𝑖𝑡—which can be interpreted mainly
16The JPA cap is reduced for part time employees. Due to the low share of part time employ-
ment, I will ignore this rule.
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Table 3: Estimated budgetary effect of the JPA
Year Target group Total fiscalcost (HUF bn)
Tax revenues from
behavioural
effects (HUF bn)
Self-financing
ratio (%)
2013 Below 25 22 5 24
2014 Below 25 29 9 31
2015 Below 25 32 14 42
2013 Above 55 41 5 12
2014 Above 55 47 7 16
2015 Above 55 50 7 14
2013 Low-skilled 25 12 50
2014 Low-skilled 31 13 41
2015 Low-skilled 32 23 70
2013 Total 87 23 26
2014 Total 108 29 27
2015 Total 115 43 38
Note: Budgetary expenditures are only available in aggregated form, for each target group.
Some employers claim the low-skilled tax credit for some of their young, or old employees, while
these groups were separated for the regression analysis (see Subsection 4.1). Using the unad-
justed budgetary figures would lead to upward biased self-financing ratios for the below 25 and
above 55 groups, and a downward biased ratio for the low-skilled group. The total costs were
adjusted by re-weighting the amount of tax expenditure claimed with the enrolment figures for
the months of May from the micro data for each target group. After the re-weighting the cost
for the career starters’ tax credit was added to the below 25 group’s cost.
as labour demand elasticities— for each target group 𝑖 and year 𝑡 as
𝜂𝑖𝑡 =
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−𝛽𝑖𝑡
1.285⋅𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−14500
1.285⋅𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
− 1
where 𝛽𝑖𝑡 refers to 𝛽4𝑡 from Equation (1) for each target group, and 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 and
𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 are the average employment rates and wages for each year and target
group. Similarly to the budgetary estimates, both the employment rate and av-
erage wage exclude participation in the public works programmes. The results
are shown in Table 4.
A recent meta analysis of own-wage labour demand elasticities by Lichter,
Peichl and Siegloch (2014) shows an average elasticity of −0.25. However, they
found large heterogeneity in the estimates. According to their results, Central
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Table 4: Estimated labour demand elasticities for the major JPA target groups
2013 2014 2015
Below 25 −0.45 −0.75 −1.06
Above 55 −0.17 −0.26 −0.26
Low-skilled −0.56 −0.52 −0.92
Eastern European economies show a higher labour demand elasticity and the
elasticity for low-skilled labour demand is higher. The predicted value from
their model of a reduced form estimate for the total own-wage elasticity for low-
skilled workers based on administrative panel data for Hungary ranges from
−0.78 to −0.90 for short-run to long-run elasticities. The elasticity of −1 in this
paper—which can be considered as an intermediate-term elasticity, where firms
have adjusted their labour demand, yet the capital stock has not fully adjusted—
is higher. This difference could be explained by the fairly large shock to labour
costs (close to 9% reduction in labour cost on average), or the timing of the tax re-
form, which was during a period of economic recovery after the Great Financial
Crisis.
Krrikyan (2013) has recent structural estimates for Hungarian labour de-
mand elasticities for 2009 with a short-run elasticity for low-skilled at −0.27,
and long-run elasticity at −1.83 for low-skilled workers.
Elasticity estimates for a comparable tax reform and methodology can be
found in Egebark and Kaunitz (2017). They estimate an elasticity of−0.32 using
a reduced form model for young employees in a targeted cut in Sweden. They
estimated wage effects as well, which would result in a somewhat higher elasti-
city, compared to the method used in this paper. Nevertheless, there is a large
difference between the two estimates. The higher Hungarian elasticity is in line
with other studies (e.g. Lichter, Peichl and Siegloch 2014) and it could also be
explained by the differences in the Swedish and Hungarian labour market situ-
ation. Sweden has very high participation rates, while in Hungary some groups,
including the young workers have low participation, especially high rates of
people not in employment, education, or training (NEET). While Egebark and
Kaunitz (2017) found no major effect among unemployed (as opposed to the
total affected cohorts) either but the large pool of potential workforce among
the Hungarian youth and the different skill distributions in the two countries
can explain the higher effects for the JPA.
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7 Conclusions
I estimated the employment effects of a recent Hungarian targeted tax incentive
scheme called the Job Protection Act (JPA) of 2013. It reduced employers’ social
security contributions of several groups that had low labour market participa-
tion, like the young, the old, the low-skilled, and long term unemployed. I used
a quasi-experimental setup, exploiting the discontinuities of the JPA eligibility
criteria with a differences in differences estimator using administrative micro
data sources to identify the effects of the tax cuts.
The estimates show robust, statistically and economically significant effects
for the programme. Employers already adjusted their labour demand in the first
year of the introduction of the JPA, and by 2015—after being in force for three
years— the programme had significant positive effects on employment. It con-
tributed significantly to the higher employment rates of young and low-skilled
workers but it only marginally increased employment for older workers. Em-
ployment rates for the young increased by 2.6%, for the low-skilled by 2.2%, and
for the old only by 0.8%. The change in the employment rate among the old was
driven by the higher employment of women. There were no gender differences
among the other groups. I found some evidence of employment churn, where
employers substituted employees eligible under the JPA for similar but not eli-
gible workforce. However, the magnitude of this effect was small, it reduced the
net employment gains by less than 3,000 among the the low-skilled. Overall the
JPA led to a net employment gain of around 50,000 which amounts to 1.2% of
the labour force. Higher employment increased tax and social security revenues
as well. Self-financing ratios— the ratio of the extra revenue from newly hired
employees and the total fiscal cost of the programme—were as high as 70% in
the low-skilled target group and 40% in the young target group, but only 14%
in the old target group.
The JPA credit for the long term unemployed increased exit rates from un-
employment by around 0.7%. It is a substantial increase but due to the low take-
up rate and small target groups this raised employment by 3,500 at most. The
JPA also reduced the employers’ social security contributions of employees re-
turning after a child-care leave but due to the limitations of the available data I
couldn’t analyse the programme’s effect in this target group.
Employment effects are not the only possible channels through which em-
ployers and employees can react to the JPA. A possible extension of this ana-
lysis could look at effects on wages, or employer performance, like sales, or
profits. Saez, Schoefer and Seim (2017) showed that a Swedish tax incentive
targeting young employees similar to the JPA increased the employment for the
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targeted population but it had no direct effect on young employees’ wages (as
showed previously by Egebark and Kaunitz 2017 for this reform). However,
firms that had a high share of young employees prior the tax reform increased
their sales, profits and wages for all of their workers relative to other firms. This
suggests that firm level wage rigidities—perhaps equity concerns— limit the
pass-through of the tax cuts in wages. The high estimated labour demand elasti-
cities suggest the potential wage effects could be low but analysing these adjust-
ments can be a potential extension of this paper.
The results in this paper show that the targeted tax cuts of the Job Protec-
tion Act successfully contributed to the labour market recovery in Hungary at
a relatively low fiscal cost. However, there might be some scope to refine the
programme by focusing on those groups, where the labour demand elasticity is
higher.
Another interesting finding is the low take-up rate for the long-term unem-
ployed in child-care returnee groups. This might be explained by the complex
administration required from both the job-seekers and the employers. Take-up
in the three major target groups—below 24, above 55, low-skilled— is higher,
and employers can easily claim the tax credit on theirmonthly tax filingswithout
any need for further proof, as eligibility can be checked using available data. Ac-
cording to my results the JPA substantially raised the chances of exiting unem-
ployment, therefore encouraging participation could be a cost effective way of
helping the long-term unemployed. This could be achieved by providing better
information about the JPA to employers, or by easing the administrative burden
of the programme in this target group.
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A Tables
Table 5: Regression results for the below 25 target group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JPA −0.198∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
2010 0.016∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2013 −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2014 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2015 −0.002 −0.002 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2010 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2011 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2013 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2014 0.030∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2015 0.044∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female −0.082∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age 0.042∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Employment (lagged) 0.447∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.457∗∗∗ −0.627∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.012)
N 2,988,244 2,988,244 2,988,244 2,988,244
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level.
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Table 6: Regression results for the above 55 target group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
JPA −0.050∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
2010 −0.002 −0.001 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2013 −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.002∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2014 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2015 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2010 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2011 −0.001 −0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2013 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2014 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2015 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female −0.095∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.013∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Employment (lagged) 0.487∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.416∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.016) (0.001) (0.017)
N 3,282,580 3,282,580 3,282,580 3,282,580
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level.
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Table 7: Regression results for the above 55 target group by gender
Men Women
JPA 0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.002)
2010 0.021∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
2011 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001)
2013 −0.000 −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.001)
2014 0.022∗∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002)
2015 0.030∗∗∗ 0.004∗
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2010 −0.007∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2011 −0.006∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2013 0.003 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2014 0.004 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2015 0.003 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Age −0.005∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
Employment (lagged) 0.547∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.378∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.023)
N 1,561,333 1,721,247
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level.
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Table 8: Regression results for the low-skilled target group (control group
without retail workers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
JPA −0.463∗∗∗ −0.457∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2013 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2014 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2015 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.003∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2011 −0.032∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2013 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2014 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2015 0.043∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.040∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment (lagged) 0.440∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.690∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Last occupation Yes
N 8,323,472 8,323,472 8,323,472 8,323,472 8,323,472
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level.
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Table 9: Regression results for the low-skilled target group (control group in-
cluding retail workers)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
JPA −0.502∗∗∗ −0.504∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.344∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2011 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2013 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2014 −0.019∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2015 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2011 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2013 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2014 0.022∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2015 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.023∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.000∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Employment (lagged) 0.445∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.734∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Last occupation Yes
N 9,158,669 9,158,669 9,158,669 9,158,669 9,158,669
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level.
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Table 10: Logit estimates for the long term unemployed target group, all eligible
jobseekers
Exit to job
(1 month
survival)
Exit to job
(3 month
survival)
Exit to job
(12 month
survival)
JPA −0.291∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.207∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032)
2013 −0.197∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗
(0.031) (0.032) (0.038)
2014 −0.157∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.039)
2015 −0.615∗∗∗
(0.039)
JPA × 2013 0.060 0.046 −0.031
(0.035) (0.036) (0.044)
JPA × 2014 0.191∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039)
JPA × 2015 0.373∗∗∗
(0.053)
Unemployment spell length −0.039∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.155∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.021)
Age −0.008∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Educational attainment
(ref. Lower secondary)
Primary −0.549∗∗∗ −0.602∗∗∗ −0.816∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.029)
Upper secondary 0.017 0.025 0.165∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022)
Tertiary −0.086∗ −0.052 0.225∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.039)
Constant −2.104∗∗∗ −2.173∗∗∗ −2.654∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.052) (0.066)
N 2,022,271 1,538,634 1,538,634
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the district level.
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Table 11: Logit estimates for the long term unemployed target group, only job-
seekers not eligible for the major Start programmes
Exit to job
(1 month
survival)
Exit to job
(3 month
survival)
Exit to job
(12 month
survival)
JPA −0.308∗∗∗ −0.319∗∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.044) (0.054)
2013 −0.237∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗
(0.054) (0.056) (0.065)
2014 −0.278∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.074)
2015 −0.733∗∗∗
(0.070)
JPA × 2013 0.016 0.020 −0.033
(0.063) (0.066) (0.078)
JPA × 2014 0.206∗∗ 0.198∗ 0.164
(0.075) (0.077) (0.091)
JPA × 2015 0.448∗∗∗
(0.080)
Unemployment spell length −0.044∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Age −0.018∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Educational attainment
(ref. Lower secondary)
Upper secondary −0.017 −0.011 0.169∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033) (0.036)
Tertiary −0.102∗ −0.075 0.189∗∗
(0.051) (0.056) (0.068)
Constant −1.417∗∗∗ −1.444∗∗∗ −1.899∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.112) (0.118)
N 236,149 186,598 186,598
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the district level.
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Table 12: Regression results for substitution effects in the main target groups
26–27
vs.
28–30
50–51
vs.
52–53
Low-skilled
excl. retail
vs.
Manual
workers
Low-skilled
incl. retail
vs.
Manual
workers
JPA −0.000 0.000 −0.037∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
2010 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
2011 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2013 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2014 0.003∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
2015 0.005∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2010 0.003 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
JPA × 2011 0.005∗ −0.001 0.035∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2013 −0.001 0.002 −0.009∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2014 0.004∗ −0.001 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
JPA × 2015 0.005∗∗ −0.001 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Employment (lagged) 0.463∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female −0.084∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.331∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.018) (0.001) (0.001)
Last occupation Yes Yes
N 3,010,064 2,951,425 5,689,057 6,670,663
Note: ∗, if 𝑝 < 0.05, ∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.01, ∗∗∗, if 𝑝 < 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering at the individual level.
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Table 13: Descriptive statistics of the tax returns panel
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑥
2010
Employment 5,574,215 0.419 0 1
Age 5,574,215 39.679 20 59
Female 5,574,215 0.505 0 1
Employment (lagged) 5,574,215 0.533 0 1
HSCO-08 occupation 3,447,749 5203.699 110 9, 220
2011
Employment 5,567,835 0.427 0 1
Age 5,567,835 39.726 20 59
Female 5,567,835 0.503 0 1
Employment (lagged) 5,567,835 0.590 0 1
HSCO-08 occupation 3,392,774 5190.466 110 9, 332
2012
Employment 5,557,169 0.416 0 1
Age 5,557,169 39.789 20 59
Female 5,557,169 0.502 0 1
Employment (lagged) 5,557,169 0.595 0 1
HSCO-08 occupation 3,354,003 5198.716 110 9, 332
2013
Employment 5,525,704 0.411 0 1
Age 5,525,704 39.803 20 59
Female 5,525,704 0.500 0 1
Employment (lagged) 5,525,704 0.586 0 1
HSCO-08 occupation 3,334,979 5230.431 110 9, 332
2014
Employment 5,476,501 0.420 0 1
Age 5,476,501 39.760 20 59
Female 5,476,501 0.499 0 1
Employment (lagged) 5,476,501 0.573 0 1
HSCO-08 occupation 3,341,327 5223.313 110 9, 332
2015
Employment 5,429,450 0.430 0 1
Age 5,429,450 39.739 20 59
Female 5,429,450 0.498 0 1
Employment (lagged) 5,429,450 0.585 0 1
HSCO-08 occupation 3,456,253 5314.335 110 9, 332
Note: Employment refers to the definition used throughout the paper: private sector employ-
ment in contracts that are eligible for the JPA. The definition used for the lagged employment
is broader, it includes employment in the public sector, temporary worker, self-employed, but
excludes public works participation.
Table 14: Descriptive statistics of the unemployment registry
𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑥
2012
Exit to job 507, 400 0.023 0 1
Exit to job (min 3 months) 507, 400 0.021 0 1
Exit to job (min 12 months) 507, 400 0.012 0 1
JPA 507, 400 0.807 0 1
Unemployment spell length 507, 400 29.489 6 191
Female 507, 400 0.489 0 1
Age 507, 400 40.056 18 62
Education 507, 400 1.858 1 4
2013
Exit to job 524, 259 0.019 0 1
Exit to job (min 3 months) 524, 259 0.016 0 1
Exit to job (min 12 months) 524, 259 0.010 0 1
JPA 524, 259 0.831 0 1
Unemployment spell length 524, 259 32.716 6 203
Female 524, 259 0.485 0 1
Age 524, 259 40.512 18 62
Education 524, 259 1.847 1 4
2014
Exit to job 506, 975 0.020 0 1
Exit to job (min 3 months) 506, 975 0.017 0 1
Exit to job (min 12 months) 506, 975 0.011 0 1
JPA 506, 975 0.798 0 1
Unemployment spell length 506, 975 36.667 6 215
Female 506, 975 0.491 0 1
Age 506, 975 40.829 18 62
Education 506, 975 1.822 1 4
2015
Exit to job 483, 637 0.013 0 1
Exit to job (min 3 months) 0 . . .
Exit to job (min 12 months) 0 . . .
JPA 483, 637 0.792 0 1
Unemployment spell length 483, 637 40.497 6 217
Female 483, 637 0.507 0 1
Age 483, 637 41.184 18 62
Education 483, 637 1.811 1 4
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Table 15: List and descriptive statistics of HSCO-08 occupations for 2012, and selection into control groups for the low-skilled
estimations
Wage
HSCO-08 3-digit code Avg.(HUF)
Median
(HUF)
Rel. to
HSCO
cat. 9
(%)
Employed Treated/Control
511 Commercial occupations 111,606 108,000 5.2 146,365 None
512 Other commercial occupations 129,026 117,133 21.6 22,464 None
513 Catering industry occupations 100,960 108,000 −4.9 45,467 None
521 Personal service workers 73,445 59,500 −30.8 11,412 None
522 Personal care workers 124,479 113,000 17.3 22,010 None
523 Stewards, attendants 206,038 196,136 94.2 4,099 None
524 Building maintenance occupations 139,754 120,000 31.7 4,576 None
525 Life and property protection occupations 214,451 194,721 102.1 53,068 None
529 Other services occupations 142,880 127,910 34.7 13,474 None
611 Plant cultivation occupations 112,053 108,000 5.6 7,430 Control
612 Animal producing occupations 143,820 138,310 35.5 11,761 Control
613 Mixed crop and animal producers 120,515 108,000 13.6 636 Control
621 Forestry workers 92,997 92,999 −12.4 2,562 Control
622 Game-farming occupations 125,047 111,000 17.8 1,265 Control
623 Fish-farming occupations 129,350 120,543 21.9 459 Control
711 Food producing, processing and preservation occupations 124,631 120,783 17.5 23,744 Control
721 Garment and leather industry workers 115,348 108,001 8.7 19,722 Control
722 Wood industry occupations 120,858 108,800 13.9 12,039 Control
723 Printing trades workers 177,062 144,095 66.9 7,210 None
731 Metallurgical occupations 162,879 153,474 53.5 183 None
732 Metal working occupations 189,107 162,400 78.2 68,758 None
733 Maintenance and repair mechanics of machines and equipment 188,229 164,200 77.4 41,519 None
734 Technicians and mechanics of electrical equipment 221,907 193,300 109.1 25,193 None
Continued on next page
Table 15—Continued from previous page
Wage
HSCO-08 3-digit code Avg.(HUF)
Median
(HUF)
Rel. to
HSCO
cat. 9
(%)
Employed Treated/Control
741 Handicraft workers 114,795 93,000 8.2 6,128 None
742 Precision instrument mechanics 172,633 155,000 62.7 1,827 None
751 Master builders’ occupations 111,028 108,000 4.6 19,161 Control
752 Construction, assembly occupations 156,675 135,000 47.7 32,831 None
753 Specialized construction industry occupations 113,257 108,000 6.7 13,857 Control
791 Other industry and construction industry occupations 204,035 161,221 92.3 11,787 None
811 Food, beverage and tobacco products machine operators 165,758 146,952 56.2 6,070 Control
812 Light industry machine operators and production-line workers 135,429 121,702 27.6 18,656 Control
813 Basic chemicals and chemical products manufacturers machine operators 225,592 187,402 112.6 24,065 None
814 Base materials products machine operators 199,268 182,318 87.8 4,620 None
815 Metal processing and finishing plant operators 204,466 177,000 92.7 16,853 None
819 Other manufacturing machine operators 165,406 147,909 55.9 16,762 None
821 Assemblers 164,408 153,416 54.9 62,257 None
831 Mining plant operators 392,653 370,560 270.0 3,377 None
832 Other stationary machine operators 202,960 168,347 91.3 18,266 None
841 Drivers of vehicles and related occupations 163,207 137,235 53.8 101,881 None
842 Mobile machinery operators 170,469 156,500 60.7 33,731 None
843 Shipping occupations 154,382 140,589 45.5 491 None
911 Cleaners and helpers 93,554 94,603 −11.8 69,797 Treated
921 Garbage collectors and similar occupations 129,054 122,418 21.6 3,008 Treated
922 Transport and storage labourers 140,150 130,000 32.1 55,102 Treated
923 Other simple service and transport occupations 99,522 94,700 −6.2 84,588 Treated
931 Simple industry occupations 106,746 100,000 0.6 32,863 Treated
932 Simple construction industry occupations 90,350 93,000 −14.9 24,824 Treated
933 Simple agricultural, forestry, hunting, fishery labourers 93,538 93,000 −11.8 11,174 Treated
